-
observing the unobservable without visualization
For theories about the unobservable underlying causal structures of the world (like Bohr’s theory of the atom), should we require that the theory use only entities and behaviors that are visualizable?
-
circular arguments in 19th and 20th century science
Does the 19th and 20th century physicist argument in favor of assuming the walls of the furnaces are at least 'partially composed of electrically charged oscillators' hold any weight?
-
leibniz's impossible request
Should Newton have simply rejected Leibniz’s complaint that he hadn’t explained the causes of the properties of gravity?
-
the non-primitive nature of 'primitive' science
If one criterion for successful scientific inquiry used today is developing algorithms for predicting future events, then weren’t the Babylonians doing successful science by our own criteria?
-
the usefulness of 'purely mathematical' structures
Should the creation of purely mathematical structures that don’t claim to be accurate models of the physical world (like Ptolemy’s model) but which nonetheless serve as effective calculating instruments for predicting future events be a goal of scientific inquiry?