understanding william james' 'humanism and truth'

William James introduces his version of pragmatism, which he refers to as ‘humanism,’ as a broader version of Peirce’s pragmatism. Peirce says that a concept’s meaning lies in the sum of the concrete differences that it will make, and encourages people to bring all concepts to the pragmatic test of clarity. James’ humanism goes beyond this method, and outlines a theory of truth. In Humanism and Truth, James defends humanism from its critics and explains the main points of the theory: that, in order to be deemed true, an experience must be taken account of in a satisfactory way (a way which brings about no contradiction with past experiences) when taken in conjunction with all other knowable experiences.

James compares some critics of humanism to Catholics who refute evolution on the basis that ‘less cannot produce more.’ These arguments, James claims, are too narrow to take in the inductive argument — but humanism, like many wide scientific generalizations, will overcome these refutations. James urges the reader to be inductive-minded, to refrain from being overly-logical, to let the situation and experiences guide our thinking instead of holding fast to rigorous definitions, because it is useless to constantly accept things as they are.

He gives us a brief history of how humanism arose. People once believed that scientific formulas were used to express divine truths and the geometry that God has laid out. However, we now understand that there are some geometric, chemical, physical hypotheses that are not always true. This is an indication of the formulas being more ‘human’ than replications of some divine code. With this realization, we have now come to accept approximation instead of exactness, and thus was born humanism, where we can accept some approximation or ambiguity of the world at first, and begin to see a clearer picture of reality as we accumulate experiences. With this pragmatic method, we remember to believe in a theory and lend it credence until it gives us reason to abandon it, rather than clinging to prior conceptions or widely-held ‘truths’.

In order to clear some of his earlier vagueness, James attempts to detail his method of ‘playing sympathetically with humanism.’ Experience, he says, constantly provides us new information that we can incorporate into our past beliefs, while rearranging these past beliefs accordingly. Each new experience informs our conception of reality by passing through the ‘denkmittel,’ a tool in our minds which assigns each experience to its place. This process helps give rise to common sense discoveries (truths we now take for granted as common sense, but once were not so widely accepted), such as the conceptions of time, space, and object-permanence. Once someone’s experience helps discover one such conception, their reality is altered. When the notion is shared with others, their worldviews and realities are also altered and clarified. There are three steps in the process of humanistic thought: first, engaging in a chaotic experience that incites questions. Second, defining categories as a framework for the answers to these questions. Third, detailing the answers in such a way that is consistent with our prior experiences. James maintains that humanism does not concern itself with whether the universe has some true structure, nor whether our findings are in agreement with this structure. In general, humanism claims that truth means relating unclear statements about subjects to the clearer notion of the subjects themselves. While we can choose to seek these relations out through experience, we can also choose not to (though many experiences, and thus the humanistic process, are inevitable — they simply happen to us).

Critics of humanism like Bradley claim that ‘true thought must correspond to a determinate being which it cannot be said to make,’ implying that there is no true thought from a humanistic point of view. James rebuts by taking issue with the ‘looseness’ of the three italicized segments of Bradley’s claim.

Firstly, James says, we ‘correspond’ with anything we enter into relations with by (perhaps involuntarily) adding our thought to it — for example, we may agree with a proposition or obey a demand, and this is added to our current accumulation of experiences. However, by ‘correspondence,’ critics of humanism mean that thoughts must copy reality. James pushes back on this idea — why do we ought to copy? James provides an example: imagine first that you embody the entire reality of the universe. Then, say another being is created who knows you completely. Would you want the being’s perception of reality to be a copy of you? Likely not, as you already know yourself, and probably have no use for a (possibly imperfect) duplicate. Either way, you would like for your universe to be enriched, and the content of the other being’s reality should serve to benefit you both. Here, there is no necessity or ought for a copy of reality and similarly, there is no necessity for us either. James expresses also that there are many ways to make meaningful relations with reality that are not just copying. One such relation is the human conception of mathematics. It would be impossible to copy the ‘objective reality’ of a God’s geometrizing since it would likely be incomprehensible. So, we as humans seek to gain a closer understanding of a reality by not copying, but conceiving our own interpretation of this geometry.

Second, humanism does account for a ‘determinate being’ inside of finite experience, where determinate being refers to a clear, specific conception of something. The reality of these beings consists in the fact that we take account of them (again, perhaps even without us noticing) and harmoniously join these conceptions with our past experiences.

Finally, to say that our thought cannot be said to ‘make’ this being is to say that if we were not here to conjure up this thought, that the ‘independent reality’ of the being would be preserved. However, humanism allows for these independent determinations as well, and is consistent with the notion that there are some questions that, once posed, can only be answered one way. For example, there were always seven stars that made up the Big Dipper. No matter when the question is raised of how many stars make up the constellation, the answer will always be seven, fitting with the conception of an independent determination. The only extra consideration humanism makes is that there once was no one to raise the question — that is, the truth always existed, but just needed a ‘counting and comparing mind’ to find it.

James now turns to his absolutist critics, who believe in one absolute truth outside of human knowledge. They may wonder how humanists can claim to think ‘truly’ — after all, can they not claim anything to be true if they do not believe in an absolute truth? James calls this a shallow critique. Even if there were an absolute reality, people can only guess what the absolute truth is by following humanistic clues shaped through their own personal experiences — they have no way of following an absolute truth if it does not reveal itself to them, and even if revealed, have no obligation to follow it. Absolutists might say that humanists bend the truth more readily than they do, but James responds that the absolutist themself bends the truth by pretending to know that the current standard is the absolute truth. James entertains those anti-humanists who may wonder how the humanist can defend a conception of truth that is constantly changing with new experiences. To this, James replies that humans evolved to feel pleasure when we experience consistency among our experiences. Humanism calls for fluidity in truth in order to bring about this pleasure, which is inherently valuable.

James responds to one final potential critic who may incorrectly conclude, from the humanistic view that all finite experiences ought to continue to support and harmonize with each other, that all experience must need an absolute support beyond itself. However, humanism is self-supporting, and allows for reality to grow in experiences and current mental determinations. As an example, we return once more to the Big Dipper, which makes up part of the Great Bear constellation: before human thought, there was no one to assign the likeness of a bear to this cluster of stars. But humans, through experience, made this likeness a reality.