freedom as non-denomination over freedom as non-interference

I will argue in favor of Phillip Pettit’s notion of “freedom as non-domination,” and reject John Stuart Mill’s interpretation of “freedom as non-interference,” which refers to the idea that people are only free to the degree that they are not interfered with. This definition implies that all laws created by the state are impositions on the freedom of its people. Promoters of this “negative freedom,” Pettit says, have presented a false dichotomy between the conceptions of liberty: they say you must either choose between freedom as non-interference or “the liberty of the ancients,” in which every citizen has a real say in state affairs. Due to the infeasibility of the latter, it seems as though the only possible conception of freedom is freedom as non-interference. I will argue that freedom as non-domination is able to capture violations of freedom where freedom as non-interference would not.

Freedom as non-domination states that nobody should have the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in someone else’s life. Pettit defines “interference” as an intentional act that serves to coerce someone into choosing a particular option. This can be done either by imposing a punishment or cost onto the decision-maker depending on what they choose. He defines “arbitrary interference” as interference that is not forced to align with the interests of the agent. In terms of state power, the government exercises freedom as non-domination when it is forced to align with the interests of the public.

There are many instances in which freedom as non-interference would characterize a situation as free while our natural conceptions may prove otherwise. Mill makes no distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary laws, and simply maintains that all law is coercive. This line of reasoning allows other proponents of this conception (Hobbes and Bentham) to disregard Americans’ call to end Britain’s rule, arguing that because all law is coercive, the American and British people faced the same injustice. Pettit implies that the arbitrariness of British rule is what made it unjust, so the idea of freedom as non-domination is necessary to address this issue.

With freedom as non-domination, loss of freedom occurs even when someone has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily. For example, imagine a woman who lives in a society in which husbands are allowed to completely control and abuse their wives. Even if the woman’s husband does not abuse her or otherwise exercise his powers, she is still unfree to the extent that he is able to dominate her if he wishes to. Under Mill’s conception, if she is not interfered with physically, she is free. So again, if we agree with the idea that the woman is unfree, we must also agree that freedom as non-domination aligns more with our values than freedom as non-interference.

One important sphere where freedom is relevant is the workplace. Under capitalism, there is an inherent class divide between the capitalist class and the working class. The capitalists own the means of production: the land, labor and capital used to produce goods. The workers, on the other hand, own only their labor power, which they will sell to the capitalists in exchange for a salary. Since workers’ access to resources are dependent on the salary provided by capitalists, workers have no say over their own work and what or how they produce goods. This is a lack of freedom that can be explained by freedom as non-domination. Clearly, there is a cost associated with workers not following their bosses’ orders: the workers may be fired, lose promotions or other privileges in the workplace. This presence of coercion implies interference. Now, to show that there is specifically arbitrary interference, we need to show that this interference does not align with the interests of the workers. Take the case where a farmer is more knowledgeable about producing corn than his boss, the farm owner. Under capitalism, the boss is able to coerce the farmer into producing corn in some less efficient way, and may fire the farmer for refusing. This does not align with the interests of the farmer because if he had produced corn differently, he could have been making a higher wage. So, this is an arbitrary interference, and a limitation on freedom which is not explained by freedom as non-interference. Under Mill’s conception, the farmer is not being interfered with because there is no prospect of physical harm from his employer, so there is no violation of freedom occurring. Thus, if we agree that the farmer’s freedom is being limited, we must agree with freedom as non-domination. Freedom as non-domination clearly limits the scope of what we consider to be a violation of freedom, and in order to capture all infringements, we must utilize freedom as non-interference instead.